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Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off after
an Acquisition?
ELLEN B. MAGENHEIM
DENNIS C. MUELLER

Out of the massive amount of research on
acquisitions that has been conducted over
the past 20 years, some consensus on
major issues has emerged. But perhaps sur
prisingly, several key issues remain in dis
pute. On the positive side, early theoretical
contributions showed that diversification
through mergers was an inefficient method
for spreading risks (Levy and Sarnat, 1970;
Smith, 1970; Azzi, 1978), and empirical
findings have corroborated this result
(Smith and Schreiner, 1969; Mason and
Goudzwaard, 1976). All observers have
found that shareholders of acquired com
panies enjoy substantial immediate gains
from the acquisitions, and no disagree
ment exists on this point. But the pattern
of results with respect to the returns to ac- .
quiring-firm shareholders has been varied.
One study claims to find positive gains; an
other records negative returns. Nor do
reviewers of this literature reach a consen
sus (e.g., compare Mueller, 1977, 1980;
Scherer, 1980, pp. 138-141; Halpern, 1983;
Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
This lack of consensus carries over into
the explanations for why acquisitions
occur. One group of observers sees acqui
sitions as a means for improving the allo
cation of assets by transferring assets to ^
more capable management or achieving
other synergistic gains from the transfer of
control (Manne, 1965; Mandelker, 1974;
Dodd and Ruback, 1977). Adherents to
this view claim that the existing evidence
indicates that acquiring-firm shareholders

are slightly better off or, at minimum, no
worse off as a result of acquisitions (Hal
pern, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Although this interpretation of the evi
dence, if valid, would appear to vindicate
a liberal antimerger policy (acquired-firm
shareholders are better off; acquiring-firm
shareholders are not worse off), it still
raises fundamental questions about the
theory of the firm and the market for cor
porate control, which feed back onto the
broader policy issues. Acquired-firm man
agers may sometimes be unwilling partners
to an acquisition, as in a hostile takeover,
but acquiring-firm managers need never
be. Why do the latter enter so readily into
the market for corporate control, given its ,
well-known large risks and apparently
modest returns?
Several observers have answered this
question by hypothesizing that managers
undertake acquisitions which increase
their utility but do not necessarily increase
shareholder wealth (Mueller, 1969; Firth,
1980; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Greer,
1984). To the extent that these hypotheses
are valid, the possibility must be enter
tained that acquisitions neither enhance
acquiring-firm shareholder wealth nor con
fer broader social benefits. Thus, the issue
of what the gains to acquiring-firm share
holders are is central to both the theory of
the firm and public policy regarding
acquisitions.
For this reason, the seemingly contradic
tory results regarding the effects of acqui-
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sitions on acquiring-firm shareholders and
the lack of consensus among observers of
what the results signify are disconcerting.
It is the thesis of this paper that disagree
ment regarding the impact of acquisitions
'^on acquiring-firm shareholders stems in
part from the different methodologies in
dividual studies have used. Measures of
the impact of an acquisition on acquiringfirm shareholders are quite sensitive to the
choice of methodology. In effect, authors
have been asking different questions about
the performance of acquiring-firm shares
and, not surprisingly, have come up with
different answers. We shall show that when
one attempts to ask the same question in
V each study, the results turn out to be far
more consistent than was heretofore
apparent.
To do so, we reexamine the basic meth
odology used to measure the effects of ac
quisitions, placing particular emphasis on
the pattern of returns to acquiring-firm
shareholders before and after the acquisi
tion (the first section). In the second sec
tion, we demonstrate the sensitivity of the
results to the choice of methodology, i.e.,
to the particular question asked, using data
for 78 mergers and takeovers in the years
1976 to 1981. In the light of the method
ological issues raised in the first two sec
tions, we reexamine the results of several
published studies in the third section. Con
clusions follow.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF
ACQUISITIONS

The basic assumption underlying the use
of stock market data to estimate the effects
of acquisitions is, of course, that share
prices reflect future profit and dividend
streams, and that any changes in future
profit and dividend streams an acquisition
is expected to bring about are reflected in
" changes in the prices and returns of the
company’s shares. Granting this assump
tion, one can test for the expected effect of
an acquistion on future profit and divi
dend streams by measuring the change in
returns to acquiring-company shareholders

accompanying an acquisition. To measure
such a change, two questions must be an
swered: When is the effect of the acquisi
tion on stockholder returns to be mea
sured? How is the effect of the acquisition
separated from other coterminous events
that affect stockholder returns?
The first question could be easily re
solved if all of the relevant information re
garding an acquisition were to become
public on the day the acquisition is an
nounced and the market could be assumed
to adjust fully in that day to the new infor
mation. But news of an acquisition is
known to leak into the market prior to the
first public announcement, and it is un
realistic to assume that the market is ca
pable of predicting the full future conse
quences of an acquisition immediately
upon learning of it. The latter point is a key
part of our critique of the existing litera
ture and requires some elaboration.
Robert Shiller (1981) has shown that
swings in stock market prices exceed by
factors of five and more those which
should have occurred given the actual
movements in dividend streams that
occur. In a bull market, prices rise by far
more than subsequent increases in divi
dends will warrant; in a bear market, they
fall too far. The market has historically
continually shifted from being too optimis
tic in bull markets to being too pessimistic
in bear markets. Shiller (1984, 1986) hy
pothesizes that the behavior of individuals
in the stock market is best explained
' through the psychology of fads and band
wagon movements.
Shiller’s findings and his explanation of
them are particularly relevant to the liter
ature on mergers and takeovers, since it is
well known that acquisition activity has
been highly correlated with stock market
activity.* Mergers and takeovers have occured most frequently at times when stock
' market prices are rising and the market in
general is known to be overly optimistic
about the future performance of compa
nies. Since acquisition and stock market
activity seem to respond to the same un
derlying economic environment and psy
chological factors (Geroski, 1984), it is rea
sonable to suppose, or at least prudent to
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allow for the possibility, that the stock
If all events other than the acquisition
market might be overly optimistic in its
that affect a firm’s returns have the same
evaluation of acquisitions at the time they
effect on the firm’s control group, then one
are first announced. Shiller’s results, com
should be able to isolate the effect of an ac
quisition by predicting the change in re
bined with the positive correlation of ac
quisition and stock market activity, sug
turns for the acquiring firm from the ob
gest the importance of tracing the effects of
served change in returns for the eontrol
an acquisition’s announcement on a
group firms, and calculating the difference
between observed and predicted returns as
stock’s price over a long enough period to
ensure that any changes in stock prices are
the effect of the acquisition. The most fre
an unbiased reflection of the future effect
quently employed control group in acqui
of the acquisition on profits and dividends.
sition-stockholder returns studies is the
market portfolio, the returns on all securi
The second conceptual issue to be re
solved is the separation of the effects of
ties each weighted by its aggregate market
the acquisition from other coterminous
value.
More formally, the returns for a given
events, i.e., the prediction of what the re
turn on the firm’s shares would have been
firm i are predicted from the characteristic
in the absence of the acquistion, over
line
whatever period is chosen to record this
E (f?,) =
-F 0, [E (/? J -Rf] (11.1)
event. The counterfactual can never, of
course, be truly predicted. Three approxi
where £'(jR,) and E{R„) are the expected re
mations have been employed in the litera
turns for firm i and the market portfolio,
ture: (1) to assume the firm’s returns post
respectively, Rf is the return on a riskless
event would have been the same as its re
(0 = d) asset, and /J, is the covariance of fs
turns preevent in the absence of the acqui
returns with the market portfolio divided
sition, (2) to select a control group and as
by the variance of the market portfolio.
sume the firm’s returns postevent would
Equation (11.1) is one of the eentral results
have been the same as those of the control
of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
group firm(s), or (3) a combination of (1)
It states that the return on any firm i’s
and (2), i.e., to assume that the change in
returns of the acquiring firm following the ^ shares, Ri, varies directly with the return
on the portfolio of all shares,
and thus
acquisition’s announcement would have
that changes in
can be predicted from
been the same as the change in returns for
changes in R^ if /3, is unchanged.^ The d,
the control group firm(s) for the same time
term can be estimated from a time-series
period. The difference between this pre
or, as is frequently
regression of /?„ on
dicted change and the change actually ob
done, from a regression of (i?„ — Rf) on
served is attributed to the acquisition. The
{R„, — Rf). By Equation (11.1), the inter
third method is obviously the best. If one
cept of this equation should equal zero.
simply compares a firm’s postevent perfor
But if the intercept is not constrained to
mance to its preevent performance, one ig
equal zero, regressions of the following sort
nores all of the other events that may be
typically yield nonzero estimates of a,:
occurring coterminously with the acquisi
tion and affecting its returns. But if one
(.R, - Rf)
predicts a firm’s returns in the postevent
period entirely from the control group
= + 3/ {Rm, — Rf) + ^it (11-2)
(method 2) one ignores any systematic dif
ference between the merging firm(s) and
Now a, is basically the average residual
the control group that may exist. This lat
from the characteristic equation (11.1) for
ter point proves to be very important be
firm i implied by the CAPM. As such, it is
cause, as we shall see, there are sizable dif
a measure of the performance of the com
ferences between the performance of
pany over the sample period used to esti
acquiring firms and the usually employed
mate |3, (Jensen, 1969), and has been so
control groups over the preevent period.
used in some acquisition studies (e.g., Wes-
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ton, Smith, and Shrieves, 1972). A com
firm’s performance that precipitate acqui
pany with a, > 0 has on average earned
sitions. But if managers undertake acqui
higher returns than are predicted by the
sitions which worsen the performance of
CAPM. If |8, were not affected by the ac
their companies’ shares, it is logical to as
quisition, one way to estimate the effects of
sume that they would choose to announce
the acquisition would be to estimate a, J the acquisitions at times when the perfor
from data from before the acquisition and
mance of their shares is above average.
again from data following its announce
Also, the above-normal return perfor
ment. The change in a, between the two pe
mance of acquiring-firm shares prior to acriods would then be an estimate of the ef : quisitions may signal above-normal profit
fect of the acquisition on firm f’s returns
flows which can be used to finance the ac
assuming all other effects are captured
quisitions. Thus, the above-normal perfor
through the movement of (i?„, — Rjj) over
mance of acquiring firms’ shares over susthe two periods. Alternatively, one can es . tained intervals prior to their making an
timate (11.2) by usiiig preevent data, and
acquisition may explain why these partic
then use the a, and estimated from the
ular firms’ managements have chosen to
preevent data to predict
from the post
make an acquisition at these particular
event R„u and Rf,. The difference between
points in time. Whether or not this conjec
the actual and predicted i?„ based on the
ture regarding casuality is correct, it seems
preevent a, and d, is a second measure of
obvious that one should take into account
the effect of the acquisition on shareholder
this preevent performance of the acquiring
firms when measuring the change in per
returns.
Both a, and ;8, are likely to vary with the
formance the acquisitions bring about.
choice of time period used to estimate
We face now three conceptual problems:
them. If this variation is random, mea
(1) How does one pinpoint the first arrival
sures of the effects of acquisitions are not
of information concerning the acquisition
biased by the choice of time period for es
to the market? (2) Over what period should
timating a, and
although the power of the preevent performance of the firm be
the tests is weakened. But there is consid
measured to determine the change in per
erable evidence, reviewed later, that ac
formance caused by the acquisition? (3)
quiring firms earn substantial, positive ab
How long a period after this event should
normal returns over a period running
one allow to measure the full effect of the
anywhere from 18 to 66 months prior to
acquisition on the acquiring firm’s returns?
the acquisition announcements. Given this
Somewhat surprisingly, the first ques
evidence, the estimates one obtains of the
tion is the easiest to answer. While acqui
effects of acquisitions are sensitive to how
sition announcements do not seem to have
the preevent data are treated when esti
had a large, systematic impact on acquirmating a, and . Studies differ widely as
ing-firm share prices, they have a predict
to how they treat the preevent period when
able and large positive impact on acquiredestimating the a, and used in predicting
firm share prices owing to the substantial
postevent performance, and this difference
premiums offered. An individual with
will be shown to have a significant influ
nonpublic information of an acquisition
ence on one’s evaluation of the impact of will make a more certain and substantial
the acquisition on stockholder returns.
gain by purchasing the shares of the to-beAlthough substantial excess returns for
acquired firm. Thus, the date of the first
acquiring firms have been estimated over
impact of the acquisition on firm share
prolonged preevent periods in several
prices can be determined by examining the
studies, little attention has been paid to
share price performance of the acquired
these returns. Perhaps the neglect of the re
firm. The month (day) in which its returns
turns to acquiring firms prior to acquisi
begin the sustained rise that culminates in
tions can be explained by the prevailing
the acquisition can be taken to be the point
view among many of those working in this
in time at which knowledge of the acqui
area that it is deficiencies in the acquired
sition reaches the market. Most studies
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seem to indicate that information of an ac
quisition reaches the market in the month
of the announcement or the month before.
No study which we have seen presents ev
idence suggesting that information of the
acquisition reaches the market more than
four months prior to its announcement.
Thus, we should expect to see the effects of
acquisitions on acquiring-firm share prices
commencing over a short time interval
prior to the announcement month.
The question of what preevent period
should be used against which to measure
postevent performance is obviously some
what arbitrary. It seems to us more reason
able to judge the effect of an acquisition
'' against the period immediately preceding
the market’s learning of the acquisition
than against a period some distance re
moved, since the acquiring firm’s perfor
mance over the three preceding years is
more relevant than over the interval four
to six years before the acquisition, if one
wishes to measure the change in perfor
mance caused by the acquisition.
If Equation (11.2) estimated on preevent
data is used to predict post-acquisition per
formance, then an improvement in perfor
mance upon the market’s obtaining infor
mation of an acquisition should appear as
an upward movement in the residuals one
obtains when preevent estimates of a, and
d, are used to predict postevent perfor
mance. Should one observe a systematic
rise (fall) in the cumulative residuals from
(11.1) commencing around the time of the
acquisition, one might reasonably attribute
this movement to the acquisition. As long
as the cumulative residuals continue the
rise (fall), which commenced with the ac
quisition, one can assume that the market
is continuing to reevaluate the expected ef
fects of the acquisition on the acquiring
firm’s performance. When the rise (fall)
stops, the adjustment process is complete.
On the other hand, the market may re
evaluate a firm’s prospects as a conse
quence of an acquisition at almost any
point in time following its announcement
at which new information is received (e.g.,
a manager leaves; a contract is lost). If all
subsequent movements in share prices not
caused by the acquisition are assumed to

175

be random, then a prudent strategy for en
suring that all possible effects on share
prices caused by the acquisition are cap
tured is to measure the acquiring firm’s
postevent performance over as long a pe
riod as possible. Here again, as we shall
show, one’s interpretation of the effects of
an acquisition is in some cases sensitive to
just how long an interval one allows the
market to complete its evaluation after the
acquisition.
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF
ACQUISITIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE
OF A SAMPLE OF ACQUIRING FIRMS

In this section, we examine the implica
tions of the methodological issues just dis
cussed for a specific sample of acquiring
firms. A description of the sample is pre
sented, and the techniques for measuring
returns are discussed. Particular emphasis
is placed on the sensitivity of the conclu
sions to the choice of a time period for
measuring the market model, and the
length of time over which postevent re
turns are measured.
Description of the Sample

The sample of 78 acquiring firms is com
posed of companies completing takeovers
valued at $15 million or more. Of the 78
acquiring firms, 51 entered into mergers
and 26 into tender offers.^ All of the firms
are listed on the New York or American
Stock Exchanges. To ensure data availabil
ity, only firms listed on Price-DividendEarnings (PDE) tapes are included. The
sample period begins in 1976. To ensure
three full years of postevent data, we spec
ify 1981 as the end of the sample period.
Announcement and completion dates and
the mode of acquisition in each case were
checked in the Wall Street Journal.
These acquisitions span a more recent
time period than do samples previously
analyzed. We describe here some charac
teristics of this sample. The distribution of
initial bid announcements is reported in
Table 11.1. These bids were made within
an active market for acquisitions.'* The
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Table 11.1 Distribution of Initial
Announcement of Acquisition Bid by Year
Year

Number of Acquisition Bids

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

9
9
21
18
7
14

level of acquisition activity intensified in
the mid 1970s following a fairly placid pe
riod; the end of the sample period coin
cides with a leveling off in the number of
transactions recorded (W. T. Grimm,
1984). This wave of activity coincides with
a periodically depressed stock market
which makes it an anomaly among acqui
sition waves.
On average, 16 weeks elapsed between
the bid announcement and completion of
'the transition; the median level is 13
weeks. The length of the interval ranges
from 1 week or less in three cases to more
than 80 weeks in two cases. The average
ratio of the preevent equity value of ac
quiring to acquired firm is 3.77. The aver
age percentage premium over stock value
paid by sample firms is 81%, and the
average value of the premium paid to ac
quired-firm shareholders is $191.58
million.
Methodology for Measuring Abnormal
Returns

To measure the effect of acquisitions on
stock price returns, we follow the Fama,
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) event study
technique. This technique relies on the use
of the market portfolio as a control group
to capture the effect of marketwide fluctua
tions in stock prices. Any remaining un
explained abnormal performance can be
attributed to the effect of a specific
event—in this case, an acquisition bid
announcement.
We estimated the following market
model using ordinary least-squares
regression.^

Rii = 01 i -I- fiiRm +

(11-3)

where
Ri, = return on stock i at time t
R„, = return on the market portfolio at
time t
Ci, = homoscedastic, normally

distributed, serially uncorrelated,
zero-mean-error term with
variance a (4)
The coefficient on R„„
measures the
sensitivity of the fth firm’s return to fluc
tuations in the market index. The intercept
measures the risk-free return plus the av
erage abnormal performance of the firm
over the sample period used to estimate
(11.3). The error measures that part of
Ri, which is due to neither movements in
the return on the market portfolio nor to
the firm’s average abnormal return.
Each R„ is calculated from monthly data
taken from the PDE tapes, with stock
prices adjusted for splits and dividends.
The New York Stock Exchange equally
weighted index is used as a proxy for the
market portfolio. Monthly residuals for
each firm / are calculated as e„ =
— R,,.
From these monthly residuals for each
firm, average abnormal returns are calcu
lated for each time t:

where I is the total number of firms and t
= 0 is the event date, i.e., the month of the
initial announcement. This yields, for each
time period, a measure of the average di
vergence between actual and forecast re
turns, adjusted for each firm’s normal level
of performance and for marketwide fluc
tuations. Cumulated average abnormal re
turns are then calculated as
CAR,,

=

f^AR,
t=X

where x and y are the start and end dates
of the cumulation period. To test the sta
tistical significance of the average and cu
mulative average abnormal returns, we
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construct a test statistic following the com
monly used procedure (Linn and Mc
Connell, 1983; Malatesta, 1983).
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Table 11.2 Cumulative Average Abnormal
Returns: All Sample Firms
Forecast Period

Estimation Period

Results

In this section, the sensitivity of conclu
sions regarding the effect of acquisitions on
firm returns to the time period used to es
timate the market model coefficients and
the length of the postevent measurement
period is shown. We first review what we
define as our basic case; then we show how
results change with the ehoice of different
estimation periods. To understand these
changes more fully, we examine how a, the
measure of the firm’s abnormal performance over the estimation period, varies
with the choice of time period.
To allow for information reaching the
market prior to an acquisition’s announce^ ment, all preevent periods are ended four
months prior to the announcement month,
an interval which seems prudent on the
basis of existing studies (see the third sec
tion). Consistent with previous research,
we find significant positive gains being
''earned in the two years preceding the
event. During the period [—24, —4] ac
quirers earn returns that are 18.4% in ex
cess of the expected returns based on their
performance over the [ — 60, —25] period
(Table 11.2). These abnormal returns are
significant at the .05 level. The pattern of
returns for each firm was examined over
this preevent period. Of the 78 firms, 71
experienced a preevent upward trend in
abnormal returns which, on average, began
at i = —33. For the 48 merging firms,
this upward trend began, on average, at
t = —29; for 21 firms making tender offers
the upward movement begins, on average,
at t = —36.
The returns for the [ — 3, —1] period,
measured by using coefficients estimated
from [ — 60, —4], introduce a trend of neg
ative but insignificant returns that contin
ues for the two years following the event.
In the third postevent year, however, sig
nificant losses of —9% occur. A pattern
emerges in which acquirers earn substan
tial positive gains until shortly before the

[-24, -4]

[-60, -25]
.1839
(3.4161f
—

[-3, -1]
[0]

•

--

[1,6]

—

[7, 12]

—

[13, 24]

—

[25, 36]
[-3, 36]

—

—

[-60, -4]

-.0148
(-.5683)
.0019
(-.3386)
-.0336
(-1.273)
-.0121
(-.6261)
-.0096
(-.3403)
-.0883
(-.2115)
-.1565
(-1.2364)

®The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are
distributed standard normal.

event, following which returns begin to
drop.
Breaking the full sample down by type of
transaction, we see similar patterns (Table
11.3). Firms engaging in tender offers and
mergers earn large positive gains prior to
the event; the level ranges from 28% for the
former group to 12.7% for the latter.
Around the event month and over the next
three years, a mixed pattern is observed.
Bidders in tender offers experience a sharp
drop in returns in the second year after the
event, a sharp rise in the third year. In the
third year, [24, 36], acquiring firms in
mergers exhibit a significant decline in re
turns. Despite these differences, we confine
most of our attention to the combined
sample of 78 acquisitions, since we do not
have enough observations on tender offers
to undertake a meaningful separate analy
sis for this group. For both groups of ac
quiring firms the pattern emerges that the
preevent period is one of positive abnor
mal performance; returns in the postevent
period reflect a lower level of performance.
The high performance in the three years
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Table 11.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns by Mode of Acquisition
Estimation Period
[-60, -25]

[-60, -4]

Forecast Period

Mergers

Tender Offers

[-24, -4]

.1271
(1.9472)“

.2804
(2.6400)

[0]

—

—

[1.6]

—

—

[7, 12]

—

—

[13, 24]

—

—

[25, 36]

—

—

[-3, 36]

—

—

[-3, -1]

Mergers
—
-.0300
(-.9918)
-.0037
(-.6769)
-.0495
(-1.3182)
-.0252
(-.6257)
.0281
(1.0110)
-.1971
(-3.709)
-.2774
(-2.6039)

Tender Offers
—
.0122
(.3078)
.0138
(.4500)
.0022
(-.1339)
.0209
(.0968)
-.0908
(-1.0091)
.1309
(1.7843)
.0892
(.5633)

“The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are distributed standard normal.

prior to the event suggests that the treat
ment of this period in estimation of the
market model coefficients may signifi
cantly affect the measurement of abnormal
returns. Since the intercept measures firm
performance over the estimation period,
an intercept calculated from this period of
above-normal performance is larger than if
calculated from a lower-performance pe
riod. With a higher benchmark the resid
uals calculated relative to this “normal”
performance level are lower.
Table 11.4 provides evidence of how the
performance benchmark embodied in a,
varies with differences in the estimation
period. The first estimate of mean a is
Table 11.4 Average Intercepts by Estimation
Period, All 78 Firms
Estimation Period
[-60, -25]
[-60, -4]
[-36, -4]
[-3, 36]
[4, 36]

Mean a
.0091
.0134
.0181
.0107
.0080

.0150
.0127
.0189
.0147
.0300

.0091, based on [—60, —25]. It is small re
lative to the estimate of .0134 calculated
from the period [—60, —4], reflecting the
upward trend in returns that begins ap
proximately three years prior to the event.
While the first estimation period stops
short of much of the rise in returns, the sec
ond period captures most of it. The esti
mates from [ — 36, —4] are from a period
of almost exclusively higher returns and
are much larger. The mean a from
[ — 36, —4] is double that estimated over
[ — 60, —25]. The measures in the last two
rows are based largely on the postevent pe
riods over which lower average returns are
observed. The mean a from [ — 36, —4] is
more than double that of the postevent pe
riod [4, 36].
These differences in a lead one to expect
sizable differences in the residuals from the
market model depending on the choice of
estimation period, and one observes them
(Table 11.5). The cumulative residuals are
uniformly lower when measured against
the last 33 months of the preevent period
[—36, —4] than when measured against
the last 57 months [ — 60, —4]. Acquiring-
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Table 11.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Based on Selected
Estimation Periods: All Sample Firms
Estimation Period
Forecast Period

[-60, -4]

[-36, -4]

[-3,-1]

-.0148
(-.5683)“
.0019
(-.3386)
-.0336
(-1.2730)
-.0121
(-.6261)
-.0457
(-1.3429)
-.0096
(-.3403)
-.0883
(-2.1150)
-.1567
(-1.2464)

-.0298
(-.7743)
-.0028
(-.4784)
-.0620
(-1.7100)
-.0508
(-1.5890)
-.1128
(-2.3328)
-.0940
(-1.5520)
-.1826
(-4.5930)
-.4221
(-4.9307)

[0]
[1,6]
[7, 12]
[1, 12]
[13, 24]
[25, 36]
[-3, 36]

[13, 36]
—
___

-.0175
(-.8249)
-.0146
(-.7386)
-.0321
(-1.1057)
___

___

—

“The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are distributed standard normal.

firm shareholders experienced an insig
nificant decline in returns of 15.67% over
the period [ — 3, 36] as measured against
the acquiring-firms’ performance over
[—60, —4]. They experienced a significant
decline in returns almost three times
greater than that when returns are mea
sured against performance over [—36,
-4],
Table 11.5 reveals that the choice of
preevent period against which postevent
performance is measured can have a sig- ^
nificant effect on one’s conclusions as to
the change in performance following an
acquisition. Several studies measure ac
quiring-firm postevent performance not
against a preevent period, however, but
against a subsequent postevent period.’
But the average performance of acquiring
firms in the postevent periods is systemat
ically lower, as measured by a, as is evi
dent in Table 11.4. Thus, use of posteventperiod estimates of the market model yield
systematically higher residuals than do
preevent estimates. The third column of
Table 11.5 reports the cumulative resid
uals for the first 12 postannouncement
months measured against the acquiring

companies’ predicted performance from
[13, 36]. They are an insignificant —3%. In
contrast, if the acquiring companies’ per
formance over these 12 months is mea
sured against how they did over the last 33
months of the preevent period, one ob
serves a significant 11% lower return in the
first year after the announcements. The dif
ferences in estimates of postevent normal
returns, depending on choice of base pe
riod against which performance is judged,
are depicted in Figure 11.1.
Acquiring firms performed substantially
better over the period [ — 24, —4] than they
did over [—60, —25]. If we define the lat
ter as normal, then acquiring firms exhibit
above-normal performance starting be
tween two and three years before the ac
quisition announcements, an interpreta
tion which is consistent with that of other
studies reviewed later. Assuming this
preevent performance is above normal,
then acquiring firms must eventually ex
hibit some worsening of performance
postevent. At some point in time, the mar
ket must adjust fully to whatever it is that
causes the above-normal performance. A
key methodological issue in judging the ef-
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Figure 11.1. Month relative to event month. For all three cases, errors in [-24, -4] are calculated
relative to performance in [-60, -25]. For case I, errors in [-3, 36] are based on [-60, -4]; for
II, they are based on [-36, -4]. Case III is identical to case I for [-24, 0]; errors for [1, 12] are
calculated relative to performance in [13, 36].

fects of acquisitions is the relationship be
tween this point in time and the announce
ment month.
To begin to answer this question, one
must explain why acquiring firms earn
above-normal returns long before an ac
quisition. One possible explanation is that
managers choose to acquire other compa^ nies when their own firms and their shares
are doing relatively well. If this assumption
is valid, the next question is whether the
acquisitions are announced toward the be
ginning, middle, or end of these periods of
above-normal performanee. This is the
kind of counterfactual question that never
can be answered in a merger study. Our ac
quiring firms exhibit an upward trend in
returns for roughly three years prior to the
announcements. If the announcements
come in the middle of the period of above
normal performance, then comparison of
the first three postevent years with the last
three preevent years would be appropriate.
Bradley and Jarrell’s calculation of
postevent performance in their comment

(Chapter 15) effectively assumes that the
announeements occur at the end of the pe
riod of above-normal performance. That
the acquiring companies’ period of above
normal performance just happens to end
around the time the acquisitions are an
nounced strikes us as an unlikely coinci
dence. Their estimate of the eumulative re
turn to acquiring-firm shareholders over
the three postevent years, which is almost
identical to our estimate of — 15.65% using
the [—60, —4] interval as benchmark, we
thus regard as an upper-bound measure of
acquiring-firm performance. The —42.2%
estimate using the interval [ — 36, —4] as
benchmark, which implicitly assumes that
the announcements occur in the middle of
the above-normal performance period, is
perhaps a reasonable lower bound.*
Our main results are summarized in
Table 11.6, in which we again break out
the merger and tender offer subsamples. If
one assumes that the market’s adjustment
to news of an acquisition takes place en
tirely within the announcement month.
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Table 11.6 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Different Time
Periods
Estimation Period [—60, —4]
Cumulation Period
10]

All Firms
.0019
(-.3386)

Mergers

Tender Offers

-.0037
(-.6769)
-.0832
(-1.7776)

.0138
(.4500)

1-3, 6]

-.0465
(-1.4039)

[-3, 12]

-.0586
(-1.4932)
-.0682
(-1.3513)

-.1084
(-1.7885)

.0491
(.2229)

-.0803
(-.6900)

-.0417
(-.4920)

-.1565
(-1.2464)

-.2774
(-2.6039)

.0892
(.5633)

[-3, 24]
[-3, 36]

.0282
(.2070)

Estimation Period [ — 36, —4]
10]

-.0028
(-.4784)

-.0070
(-.8527)

.0065
(.4637)

[-3, 6]

-.0946
(-1.8993)

-.1144
(-1.4770)

-.0514
(-1.004)

[-3, 12]

-.1454
(-2.4746)

-.1692
(-1.8976)

-.0859
(-1.2304)

1-3, 24]

-.2394
(-2.8866)

-.2125
(-1.4076)

-.2857
(-2.7711)

[-3, 36]

-.4220
(-4.9307)

-.4909
(-4.2564)

-.2734
(-2.1715)

The numbers in parentheses are the test statistics which are distributed standard normal.

then acquisitions have no significant im- ^
pact on acquiring-firm shareholders. If,
however, one allows the market three years
following the announcement to evaluate
an acquisition’s effects, then acquiring-firm
shareholders are significantly worse off fol
lowing an acquisition than they would
have been had the acquiring firms contin
ued to perform as they had over the three
years (i.e., the [—36, —4] interval) prior to
the acquisition. The hypothesis that ac
quiring-firm shareholders are better off as a
result of acquisitions fares better if one
uses the longer preevent period [—60, —4]
and, in general, if one uses shorter post
event periods.
Studies on this subject vary considerably
in their choices of pre- and postevent-period lengths when estimating the effects of
acquisitions. We favor a longer postevent
period, because we doubt that all relevant ^
information regarding an acquisition’s
likely effects reaches the market in the an

nouncement month, and that the move
ments of stock prices in the few months
surrounding an acquisition are, necessar
ily, unbiased estimates of the future con
sequences of the acquisitions.
Both the merger and tender offer sub
samples reveal substantial declines in the
stockholder returns over the three years
following the announcement month, as
judged against the [—36, —4] time-period
performance. For the merging firms, the
biggest decline occurs in the third year fol
lowing the announcement; for the tender
offer bidders, in the second. We do not
place much weight on this difference. In
deed, we anticipate significant changes in
stock market values for individual com
panies at different points of time following
the initial announcement as additional in
formation reaches the market. This antici
pation is what leads us to favor a relatively
long postevent interval for measuring the
effects of acquisitions.
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Jensen and Ruback (1983) stress the im
portance of differentiating between merg
ers and tender offers in event studies, and
some support for the position is present in
our results. Acquiring-firm shareholders
are noticeably better off in tender offers
than they are in mergers. But the similari
ties between the two subsamples are also
noteworthy. Both groups experience an up
ward trend in abnormal returns over
roughly three years prior to the acqui
sition’s announcement. Commencing
roughly with the announcement, the paths
of abnormal returns for the two groups are
refracted. After another three years, both
groups of shareholders are significantly
worse off than they would have been had
their companies continued to perform in
the postevent period [ — 3, 36] as they had
prior to the event [ — 36, —4].
If our study were the only one to expose
such a pattern of returns, one might be in
clined to dismiss the substantial differ
ences between the post and preannounce
ment acquiring-firm share performances as
curiosa of our sample. But as we shall now
illustrate, the same pattern has been ob
served in several studies from different
time periods and countries.
A REEXAMINATION OF THE EITERATURE

The results of the previous section indicate
that, at least for our sample, acquiring
firms do earn substantial, positive abnor
mal returns prior to the market’s learning
of acquisitions and that acquiring-firm
shareholders are not better off, relative to
this preevent performance, after informa
tion of the acquisition reaches the market.
Moreover, whether the acquiring-firm
shareholders are judged no better off or sig
nificantly worse off depends on both the
pre- and postevent periods used in the
comparison.
In this section, we further illustrate the
importance of these methodological issues
by examining results reported in several
other studies. While all take inspiration
from the CAPM, they actually differ in a
surprisingly large number of respects, and

it is not possible to comment on each in
detail. We focus upon the general patterns.
Our thesis emphasizes the possible im
portance of the return pattern both before
and after an acquisition, and thus we ex
clude from consideration studies that leave
out entirely or severely truncate these preand postevent periods (e.g., Halpern, 1973;
Bradley, 1980; Dodd, 1980; Asquith et al.,
1983). To facilitate comparisons, we focus
upon only those studies that measure re
turns by months or days surrounding a sin
gle-event announcement, i.e., we do not
consider studies which measure returns on
an annual basis (Hogarty, 1970; Lev and
Mandelker, 1972; and those in Mueller,
1980).
The first group of studies we wish to con
sider measures a firm’s return performance
in any day or month relative to that of a
control group. Bradley (1980), Asquith
(1983), and Asquith et al. (1983) use Cen
ter for Research in Security Prices excess
returns and thus use as a control group
companies with ^’s similar to those of the
acquiring firms. The prediction in these
studies is that an acquiring firm would
earn a return each day equal to that of
firms with similar d’s. Of the three, only
Asquith (1983) presents sufficient returns
data before and after the announcement
date to allow comparison with the other
studies in this section.
Table 11.7 summarizes his main results.
Asquith reports 22 months of returns data
prior to the announcement day. The ac
quiring firms earn positive cumulative ex
cess returns over this entire preannounce
ment period. Acquiring-firm shareholders
enjoy cumulative abnormal returns above
those earned by shareholders in the control
group of 14% between the first month in
Asquith’s data series (—22) and the last
month before the market learns of the
merger (—2). The cumulative excess re
turns for acquiring-firm shareholders reach
a peak of 14.5% above the control group on
press day and level off through the period
between announcement and consumma
tion; 30 trading days after the merger a
decline begins that continues for as long as
Asquith reports figures (roughly 17 months
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after announcement). An individual who
purchased an acquiring firm’s shares just
prior to the first signs of market knowledge
of the merger (— 1) and held them through
out the period over which Asquith reports
data would have experienced a cumulative
return 7.2% below that of shareholders of
nonacquiring firms with similar /3’s over
the same period.
An analogous procedure to that just de
scribed uses Fama-MacBeth residuals.
These are calculated from the following
equation:
eu = Ri, — 7u — 7ith
(11-4)
where
and /?, are defined as before. The
7„ and 72, parameters are the cross-section
estimates of the intercept and slope from
monthly regressions of average portfolio
returns on average d. Thus, 7,, and 72, dif
fer from month to month, but for any sin
gle month they are the same for all firms.
The acquiring firm’s predicted return for
each period t reflects market factors com
mon to all firms. Thus the use of FamaMacBeth residuals effectively treats the
market portfolio as the control group.
Table 11.7 summarizes the main results for
three studies which employ Fama-Mac
Beth residuals (Mandelker, 1974; Ellert,
1976; Kummer and Hoffmeister, 1978). All
three studies again exhibit positive pre
merger returns for acquiring-firm share
holders commencing in Ellert’s study with
the first month of data, some 100 months
prior to the merger. Mandelker’s study ex
hibits a leveling off and slight decline in re
turns commencing around the time of
merger announcement, as Asquith’s study
did. Ellert’s sample is more difficult to in
terpret, since it consists of firms whose
mergers were challenged by the FTC or
Justice Department. The firms, which
eventually succeeded in consummating the
mergers, experienced a very slight decline
in returns relative to the market portfolio
over the 48 months after the challenge to
the merger was settled.
The Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) re
sults indicate substantial positive abnor
mal returns for acquiring-firm sharehold
ers in the month the tender offer is
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announced, followed by no clear pattern. It
is the only study in Table 11.7 for which
the acquiring-firm shareholders do better
than their control group over the
combined announcement-event-postevent
period.
The four studies examined so far are
similar in that they all measure a firm’s ex
cess return in any month relative to a con
trol group’s performance. Any inference re
garding the change in acquiring-firm
performance must be drawn by comparing
the preevent performance of the acquiring
firms relative to their control groups and
their postevent performance relative to
these control groups.
All four studies report positive, abnor
mal return performance for acquiring-firm
shareholders over periods ranging from 17
to 100 months prior to announcement. All
report a poorer relative performance for
the acquiring companies’ shares over
the announcement-event-postevent pe
riod than observed for the preevent period.
Indeed, only one study reports significant
positive gains relative to the control group
for this period (Kummer and Hoffmeister),
but the abnormal gains they report for the
21 months commencing with an acquisi
tion’s announcement are only a third of
the abnormal returns the same firms
earned over the preceding 28 months. In
the Mandelker and Ellert studies, the ac
quiring firms perform roughly the same as
the control group firms following the
merger announcements. In Asquith’s
study, the acquiring firms perform signifi
cantly worse than their control group after
the mergers, where they had performed sig
nificantly better before.
Before turning to the next set of studies,
let us briefly reconsider Mandelker’s re
sults. Although the general pattern of re
turn performance in Mandelker’s study re
sembles the others, the premerger rise in
returns is much smaller. Mandelker’s sam
pling of mergers stops in 1963. Unlike the
other three studies, it does not include
mergers from the peak years of merger and
stock market activity, 1967-1969. Consis
tent with our earlier arguments that merg
ing firms’ returns may be particularly af-

Table 11.7. Before- and After-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Companies in Nine Studies

Study

Time
Period
(Country)

Control Group
Against Which
Preacquisition
Abnormal
Performance
Measured

Month
Information
of
Acquisition
Reaches
Market (f,)

Month in
Which
Cumulative
Residuals
Begin
Upward
Trend (/„)

Cumulative
Abnormal
Returns at
Month //_ 1

Control Group
Against Which
Postmerger
Abnormal
Performance
Measured

Month
Following
Acquisition in
Which Fall in
Cumulative
Residuals
Stops ((/)

Difference
Between
Cumulative
Residuals
in /yand
^-1

Last Month
for Which
Return
Performance
Reported (f^)

Difference
Between
Cumulative
Residuals
in tg and
Notes

Asquith (1983)

1962-1976
(USA)

Companies
with similar
0s

-1

-22®

14.0

Companies
with similar
0s

17

-7.2

17

-7.2

Returns reported in days.
We have converted to
months by dividing by
22 trading days per
month. Interval
between
announcement day
and merger
completion assumed
to equal 6 months.

Mandelker
(1974)

1941-1963
(USA)

Fama-MacBeth
residuals

-1

-17

3.5

Fama-MacBeth
residuals

46

+0.2

46

+0.2

Mandeiker’s data
centered around
merger completion.
We have assumed
announcement is 6
months before
completion.

Ellert(l976)

1950-1972
(USA)

Fama-MacBeth
residuals

-3

-100®

23.6

Fama-MacBeth
residuals

82

-3.4

82

-3.4

Ellert’s data centered
around month a
merger complaint is
made by antitrust
authorities. We
assume announcement
month is same as
complaint month.
Premerger returns are
for all acquirors:
postmerger for only
those which completed
the acquisition.

Kummer and
Hoffmeister
(1978)

1956-1974
(USA)

Fama-MacBeth
residuals

0

-28

17.0

Fama-MacBeth
residuals

No systematic
movement
following

20

+ 5.8

merger

Study

Time
Period
(Country)

Dodd and
Ruback
(1977)

1958-1976
(USA)

Franks et al.
(1977)

1955-1972
(UK)

Control Group
Against Which
Premerger
Abnormal
Performance
Measured

Month
Information
of Merger
Reaches
Market (//)

Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio
— 73 through
-14
Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to its
industry,
— 29 through
+8
Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio and
its two-digit
SIC industry,
-72 to -12

-1

Langetieg
(1978)

1929-1969
(USA)

Firth (1980)

1969-1975
(UK)

Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio in
48 preceding
months

Malatesta
(1983)

1969-1974
(USA)

Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio in
36-month
period from
—62 to — 1

Notes: Month 0 is the announcement month.
^First month for which data are reported.

-3

Month in
Which
Cumulative
Residuals
Begin Upward
Trend (/«)
-43

No systematic
movement
prior to

Cumulative
Abnormal
Returns at
Month ti-\
10.47

-0.3

merger

Month
Following
Merger in
Which Fall
in
Cumulative
Residuals
Stops (0

Difference
Between
Cumulative
Residuals
in /yand
ti-\

Last Month
for Which
Return
Performance
Reported {t^

Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio
+14 through
+ 73
Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to its
industry,
-29 to +8

60

- 1.85

60

-1.85

15

- 2.4

40

-0.1

Sample is for acquisitions
in brewing and
distillery. Returns are
measured net of
industry index.
Langetieg’s data centered
around merger
completion month. We
have assumed
announcement is 6
months before
completion based on
acquired-firm return
performance.

Control Group
Against Which
Postmerger
Abnormal
Performance
Measured

Difference
Between
Cumulative
Residuals in
te and //_i

-60

13.58

Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio and
its two-digit
SIC industry,
+ 12 to +72

78

-29.0

78

-29.0

-1

-48“

1.5

1

- 7.4

36

-4.8

-4(?)

-60“ (?)

3.6

Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio in
48 preceding
months
(omitting —
12 to +12)
Acquiring firm’s
performance
relative to
market
portfolio in
36-month
period in
+13 to +60

12

- 7.7

12

-7.7

0

Notes
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fected by stock market swings, both the
more modest premerger increases and
postmerger declines recorded by Mandelker may stem from his having em
ployed a merger sample drawn from a
more tranquil period of stock marketmerger activity.
The last technique for estimating the ef
fect of acquisitions we consider uses the re
siduals from some variant on Equation
(11.5):

= (Rii — Rfd — a.

-k(Rnu-Rft)

(11.5)

Recall that the value of a for the average
firm is zero and that a, thus captures a
firm’s abnormal performance over the
time period from which (11.5) is esti
mated. Thus, if (11.5) is estimated over a
period prior to the event’s announcement,
the residuals from (11.5) at and after an
nouncement do measure the change in per
formance for the firm relative to the pre
event period over which (11.5) was esti
mated. More generally, the inferences one
draws from residuals from (11.5) are sen
sitive to the time period over which it is
estimated.
This point is illustrated by the bottom
five entries of Table 11.7. We first consider
the study of Dodd and Rubaek (1977) in
some detail, since it clearly illustrates the
issues. They estimate Equation (11.5)
separately on data from [—73, —14]
and [14, 73]. If the pre- and post-tender
offer performance of acquiring firms in
their sample resembles that of the studies
just discussed, then acquiring firms exhibit
above-normal performance over some
part, if not all, of [ — 73, —14] and normal
or below-normal performance over part or
all of [14, 73]. The a’s from (11.5) over
[ — 73, —14] will be higher than those for
[14, 73].’ The residuals they report for
[ — 60, — 1] are for a and /8 estimated over
[ — 73, —14] and those for [0, 60] from
[14, 73]. Thus, the reported residuals for
the preevent period are calculated against
a benchmark of above-normal perfor
mance and are thus smaller than if they
had been measured relative to a period of
poorer performance. Residuals for the an

nouncement month and postevent period
are ealeulated against a benehmark of
poorer performanee than the preevent pe
riod and thus are certainly larger than they
would be if they were measured against the
acquiring firms’ preevent performance.
That these inferences are likely to be
valid can be seen by an examination of the
cumulative residuals for the bidding firms
in the Dodd and Rubaek study (Figure
11.2).‘° As with the studies using CRSP
and Fama-MaeBeth residuals, a period of
sustained above-normal performance is
observed commencing at A some 43
months prior to the initial tender offer
month (R), where normal is now defined as
how these firms did over the period [ — 73,
— 14]. Since acquiring-firm performance
over [ — 73, —14] is, if anything, above that
predicted from the market portfolio and
Equation (11.1), these residuals probably
understate the extent of abnormal, positive
performanee of acquiring firms prior to the
acquisitions. A period of gradual but sus
tained decline in share returns eommences
at C, month 6, about the time the take
overs are probably consummated." It eontinues through month 60 and coneeivably
through 73. It is against this period of de
teriorating performance [14, 73] that the
abnormal returns [0, 60] are calculated.
Thus, the level of returns in the interval [0,
12] is judged relative to how the firms did
from one to six years after the tender offers,
not to how they did before. A comparison
of Figures 11.2 and 11.1 reveals that Dodd
and Ruback’s acquiring-firm residuals pat
tern resembles the pattern for our sample
when a postevent estimation period is used
as benchmark (our case III). Had preevent
period a’s and |8’s been used by Dodd and
Rubaek, their postevent residuals probably
would have exhibited a steeper decline, as
with our cases I and II."
Similar reasoning calls into question
Dodd and Ruback’s conclusion that ac
quiring-company shareholders are better
off from the acquisitions on the basis of the
statistically significant average residual of
2.83% in the announcement month. The
rise in “abnormal” returns in month
0 stems in part from the switch at this
month from the higher performance period
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[ — 73, —14] a’s and d’s to the lower-period
[14, 73] estimates. That is, acquiring-firm
shares appear to have gained in abnormal
performance in month 0 partly because
the benchmark of normality has shifted
downward.
The importance of the treatment of a
and thus the choice of time period over
which a is estimated is further illustrated
by Malatesta’s (1983) study. Residuals
over the period [ — 60, — 13] are calculated
by using the first available 36 observations
from the preceding 50 months. The cu
mulative average a over [—24, —4] is 10.7,
and the forecast error is —1.6. Thus, ac
quiring firms in Malatesta’s sample also
were earning significantly higher returns
than the market portfolio prior to the mar
ket’s learning of the mergers. The modest
cumulative residuals Malatesta reports for
the premerger period relative to the acquir
ing firms’ performance over this period
merely indicate that the above-normal per
formance for the acquiring firms was fairly
uniform throughout the entire premerger
period [ — 62, —1] and thus is adequately
represented by his a estimates.
The residuals for months 1 through 60
are calculated from a and d estimated from
the first available 36 months in the interval

[13, 60]. The cumulative residuals over
[1, 12] are negative and significant even re
lative to the acquiring firms’ subsequent
performance in the postmerger period.
While Malatesta does not report the a’s for
the postmerger residuals, one presumes
from Asquith’s results that they would be
substantially less than the 10.7% cumula
tive a obtained prior to the mergers. Thus,
the acquiring firms probably did even
worse during the first 12 months after the
announcements, compared with how they
were doing before, than is implied by the
residuals Malatesta calculates relative to
the postmerger period’s a’s and d’s.
The importance of how one treats the a
estimates from Equation (11.5) is further
illustrated by the results of Langetieg’s
(1978) study. Langetieg estimates a variant
on Equation (11.5), which also controls for
movements in acquiring-firm returns com
mon to all firms in the acquiring firm’s
two-digit SIC industry. His measure of ab
normal returns for firm i is the sum of a,
and eu- Thus, although Langetieg estimates
separate a’s and |S’s for the pre- and post
merger periods, his measures of abnormal
returns do not suffer from the same prob
lems as the Dodd and Ruback and Mala
testa measures do, because Langetieg in-
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eludes the respective a’s as part of the
abnormal returns, thus building into his re
sults the systematic change in the
intercept.
The cumulative excess returns for the
acquiring firms turn positive 60 months
prior to the point in time when informa
tion of the merger reaches the market.
Over these 60 months, shareholders of ac
quiring firms enjoy excess returns of
13.58% over what one predicts from move
ments in both the market portfolio and the
acquiring firm’s two-digit industry.'^
In what is now a familiar pattern, we
witness in Langetieg’s data a leveling off of
excess returns between the market’s first
knowledge of the mergers and their con
summation, and then a sustained decline.
The acquiring-firm returns decline contin
uously over the 72 months following a
merger. A shareholder who bought into an
acquiring firm just prior to the market’s
learning of the merger and held its shares
for the next 78 months would experience a
cumulative loss relative to the market
portfolio and shareholders of other firms in
the same industry of 29%.
Firth (1980) calculates the residual at
month t from a and d estimates for the 48
months immediately preceding t, when t
varies from —48 to —13. Thus, if acquir
ing firms earned above-normal returns
uniformly over a substantial interval prior
to the mergers, this fact would not be ap
parent in the residuals for the premerger
period.
The residuals over the entire interval
[ — 12, 12] are calculated by using d’s
and d’s estimated from [—60, —13]. Thus,
unlike the results in both Dodd and Ruback and Malatesta, the immediate preand postannouncement residuals are all
calculated relative to the acquiring com
panies’ premerger return performance. As
it turns out, in Firth’s study this difference
does not prove to be important. The mar
ket adjusts fully in the announcement
month, at which time the acquiring-firm
shareholders suffer a significant 6.3% loss
relative to premerger performance. The re
siduals for the postmerger months reveal
no distinctive pattern.
The Franks et al. (1977) study of 94 ac

quisitions by United Kingdom breweries
and distilleries is difficult to analyze. They
first present, for the combined merging
companies, cumulative average residuals
which “display a strong upward bias
throughout, thus exhibiting effects which
cannot be attributed to mergers’’ (1977, p.
1521). Since the residuals for the acquiring
and acquired firms are combined, one can
not determine whether it is the perfor
mance of the former or the latter which
accounts for this positive abnormal pre
merger performance. But if it were the ac
quiring firms that were exhibiting above
normal premerger performance, the
Franks et al. results would correspond
closely to those of the other studies we
have discussed. When they control for in
dustry performance, the acquiring firms
exhibit no above-normal returns prior to
the merger. But since the acquiring firms
are part of the industry index, this choice
of control group introduces a bias toward
zero in the residual estimates.
Franks et al. estimate Equation (11.5)
over the time period [—29, 8], omitting an
interval around the announcement, which
“is adjusted on the basis of the resulting es
timates of abnormal residuals” (p. 1515).
Given that the excluded interval varies
from firm to firm, it is difficult to deter
mine against what yardstick abnormal per
formance is being gauged. Nevertheless, re
turns initially rise (from —4 through 0)
and then decline, leaving acquiring share
holders no better off as a result of the merg
ers. “Indeed since some gain would have
been anticipated as a result of premerger
interests [of the acquiring firms in the
targets], one could argue that there may
have been losses exclusive of these inter
ests” (p. 1523).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To acquire another firm, a buyer must pay
a substantial premium over the current
market value of the target. In our sample,
this premium averaged 81% of the target
firms’ market value. Thus, over the period
between the initial decision to acquire and
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the completion of an acquisition, share
holders of acquired firms enjoy substantial
increases in their wealth. The key question
for the theory of the firm and for antimer
ger policy is whether these wealth increases
measure net increases in wealth for society
as a result of some synergistic efficiency
gain, or mere wealth transfers from acquir
ing-firm to acquired-firm shareholders.
To answer this question, one must mea
sure the effects of the acquisitions on ac
quiring-firm shareholder wealth. While it
is reasonable to assume that the changes in
acquiring-firm shareholder wealth related
to the acquisition begin about the same
time as the changes in acquired-firm share
holder wealth begin, somewhere between
the announcement and four months be
fore, it is arguable whether all changes in
acquiring-firm wealth caused by the acqui
sition are complete by the date of its an
nouncement or its completion. Conceiva
bly, new information about its future
consequences might reach the market at
intermittent intervals for some time after
the market’s first knowledge of the acqui
sition. This consideration suggests that a
longer-run perspective of the consequences
of acquisitions for acquiring-firm share
holders might be appropriate than is war
ranted for acquired-firm shareholders.
Several studies have measured the per
formance of acquiring firms relative to the
average firm in the stock market or in the
acquiring firm’s industry, both before and
after acquisition announcements.A con
sistent pattern emerges. Acquiring firms
begin to experience significant positive ab
normal returns as early as 100 months
prior to the acquisition announcements.
The cumulative preacquisition gains of ac
quiring-firm shareholders are inevitably
positive and are typically large.
Starting around the time the market be
gins to learn of an acquisition, or at its con
summation, the performance of the acquir
ing firm’s shares begins to deteriorate
relative to their preevent performance. In
some cases, they exhibit a roughly normal
postevent performance (e.g., Mandelker,
1974); in others, a significant relative dec
line (Langetieg, 1978; Asquith, 1983).'^
A second set of studies measures an ac
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quiring firm’s performance as a result of an
acquisition, relative to this performance
over another period, controlling for gen
eral shifts in the economy by using the
basic CAPM equation (11.5). Given that
the acquiring firm’s performance relative
to the market (or its industry) differs sig
nificantly over the pre- and postevent time
intervals, estimates of “abnormal” returns
to acquiring-firm shareholders are sensi
tive to the choice of time period over
which the “normal” a and of Equation
(11.5) are measured. Our own results in
dicate significant above-normal returns are
earned by acquiring-firm shareholders
over the immediate two to three years
prior to the market’s learning of an acqui
sition, relative to the performance of these
firms in the three preceding years. Follow
ing the market’s receipt of information of
the acquisition, the acquiring firms’ share
holders experience lower returns than they
enjoyed over the preevent period. More
over, the deterioration in performance is
more dramatic if comparison is made with
the immediate three years’ performance
than if comparison is with the five preev
ent years.
Our findings are consistent with those of
other studies using Equation (11.5) and the
CAPM, although comparisons are made
difficult by the differing choices of time pe
riods for estimating (11.5). A significant
decline in acquiring-firm returns is ob
served by Firth (1980) in the announce
ment month and perhaps by Franks et al.
(1977) in the first few months following the
merger announcements. Malatesta (1983)
observes a significant decline in acquiringfirm performance in the first 12 months
after the announcement, relative to the ac
quiring companies’ performance over a
postmerger period; Dodd and Ruback
(1977) record a steady decline in perfor
mance over 54 months following the ac
quisition’s completion, again measured re
lative to the acquiring companies’ own
normal postevent performanee. Since ac
quiring firms perform worse after acquisi
tions than before, when measured against
the market, the decline in returns mea
sured by Malatesta and Dodd and Ruback
following the acquisitions is in all likeli-
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hood considerably smaller than it would
have been had these authors measured the
decline against the predicted performance
of acquiring firms on the basis of their
preevent histories.
Thus, the answer to the question posed
in the title of this chapter, “Are acquiringfirm shareholders better off after an acqui
sition than they were before?” seems to be
no, if by before we mean the three years or
so prior to the time information reaches
the market, and if by after we mean
the three years or so after this point in
time.
The evaluation of the effects of acquisi
tions on acquiring-firm shareholders’
wealth presented here is considerably more
negative than that found in some other
parts of the literature. Others have reached
more positive conclusions than we in part
because they have posed different ques
tions from ours. To the extent that one
focuses on the acquiring companies’ per
formance only at the time of the announce
ment (e.g., Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Brad
ley, 1980) and makes one’s comparison not
to the acquiring firms’ own preevent per
formance but to that of the market portfo
lio (e.g., Mandelker, 1974; Kummer and
Hoffmeister, 1978; Bradley, 1980), one ob
tains a more optimistic assessment of the
performance of acquiring-company shares.
Halpern (1983) ignores the evidence on
postevent acquiring-company returns en
tirely in his survey; Jensen and Ruback
(1983) clearly give more weight to the fig
ures regarding the gains at the time of ac
quisition in their Table 3 than they do to
the figures which include postacquisition
performance in Table 4. Neither survey
has much to say about the substantial pos
itive abnormal returns acquiring-firm
shareholders earn before the market learns
of the acquisitions.
The stock market is subject to substan
tial swings in returns that cannot be justi
fied by an application of the rational-ex
pectations assumption to subsequent
dividend streams. Acquisition activity is
correlated with stock market activity and
is arguably subject to the same underlying
psychological factors and motivations. The

stock market may be over- or under opti
mistic about the future consequences of ac
quisitions at different points in time.
Moreover, an acquisition is a sufficiently
complex event that it might take the mar
ket more than a single month or year to
form an aecurate estimate of its future ef
fect. These considerations suggest to us the
need for a longer-run view of the conse
quences of acquisitions. But whether or
not one agrees with us on this point, we do
hope we have achieved our goal of dem
onstrating that one’s answer to the ques
tion “Are shareholders of acquiring firms
better off after an acquisition than they
were before?” is sensitive to both the
choice of time intervals over which before
and after performance is defined and the
choice of benchmark against which perfor
mance is measured.
NOTES
1. Nelson (1959, 1966); Melicher et al.
(1983); Geroski (1984). Casual observation sug
gests that this correlation may have weakened
in the most recent years. But the cited studies
carry the analysis up through the midseventies.
Since all of the empirical work discussed in this
chapter, save our own, is from the period in
which the positive correlation has been found to
exist, our point with respect to the existing lit
erature and its interpretation is valid even if it
should prove that acquisition activity is no
longer strongly correlated with stock market
price movements.
2. Recent critiques by Roll (1977) and Levy
(1983), among others, call into question some of
the assumptions of the CAPM. While these pa
pers pose serious challenges to many of the con
clusions drawn from the CAPM, they carry less
weight with regard to the literature on the effects
of acquisitions. The market portfolio may be a
reasonable choice as a control group for pre
dicting changes in an acquiring firm’s returns,
even if it is not a reasonable portfolio for an in
dividual to hold.
3. The total number of firms exceeds the
number of firms involved in mergers and tender
offers because one of the firms could not be
classified.
4. The pattern of overall acquisition activ
ity during the sample period can be seen in this
record of completed acquisitions:
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Year

Number of Acquisitions

Percent Change

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

1145
1209
1452
1564
1583
2314

16.7
5.6
20.1
7.7
1.2
46.2

Transactions counted here are valued at $1 mil
lion or more; the list includes partial acquisi
tions {Mergers and Acquisitions, Winter 1984).
5. See Fama (1976) for a full description of
the market model.
6. Each firm error is divided by its stan
dard deviation ff(e„), where
=

Sj

{R„, - R„f

X

1/2

{R„,r-Rn.f^

r - 1

and
Sj = error variance calculated from the
_
market model regression for firm i
R„ = average return on the market portfolio
over the estimation period
T = number of months in the estimation
period
The standardized errors c„/o-(c„) are summed
and divided by I, the total number of firms, to
obtain AS„ the average standardized error for
each time period. We define z, the test statistic,
as z, = yl, (AS,), where z is distributed as ap
proximately a normal variable for large sam
ples. To obtain the test statistic for the null hy
pothesis that the CAR,,y are insignificantly
different from zero, we calculate
(y- x + 1)'/^
where z is also distributed approximately nor
mally for large samples.
7. The typical justification for choosing a
postevent period against which to measure
postevent residuals is that the ;8’s may change as
a result of the acquisition^ But those studies
which test for shifts in the |8, report no system
atic shifts in them (see the third section). Nor do
we find any. For example, only two of the 0’s
estimated over [ — 3, 36] are significantly differ
ent from those estimated over [ — 60, —4], one
being larger, the other smaller. The other 76 in
significant changes divide almost evenly be
tween increases and decreases.
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8. Michael Jensen also argues that the
postevent benchmark should be the normal per
formance of the acquiring firms, not their
above-normal preevent performance. We thank
Michael for his comment at the conference,
which helped clarify our thinking on this point.
9. Although Dodd and Ruback (1977) re
port the differences between the 0s for the two
periods, they unfortunately do not report the dif
ferences in a’s (p. 358).
10. Dodd and Ruback (1977) do not report
the cumulative residual series, so we have
added the averages they do report to obtain Fig
ure 11.2. Our Figure 11.2 corresponds to and re
sembles very closely their Figure 2.
11. Both Mandelker (1974) and Langetieg
(1978) center their data around the consumma
tion of the acquisition, not its announcement.
Judging from the acquired firms’ returns in
these studies, information regarding the mergers
would appear to reach the market about six
months before the mergers are completed. In
our sample, four months elapse on average be
tween first announcement and consummation,
which corresponds to these other studies if one
allows two months for preannouncement infor
mation leakage. We assume the gap between
announcement and consummation to be six
months in the Mandelker, Langetieg, and As
quith studies.
12. The reason Dodd and_ Ruback (1977)
give for using separate a and ^ estimates from
before and after the announcement is that for 34
of the 184 firms in their sample (18%), there is
a significant change in
(pp. 358-359). But
changes in |8 are equally divided between in
creases (10 for successful bidders) and declines
(9). Thus, no systematic shift in residuals should
result if preannouncement 0s are used. But if
postannouncement as are significantly lower
than preannouncement as, postannouncement
residuals are systematically raised by their
choice of period against which to measure
postannouncement performance.
13. Langetieg (1978) reports four sets of sim
ilar results (Table 1, p. 373). We quote from
only the first set, using an equally weighted in
dustry index.
Langetieg also reports residuals net of the
market portfolio, industry index, and the per
formance of a “well-matched non-merging
firm” (p. 371). The latter is selected from the ac
quiring firm’s two-digit industry by the criterion
that its residuals from the market portfolio
regression (11.5) have the highest correlation
with the residuals for the acquiring firm. This
criterion for selecting a control group firm
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biases Langetieg’s findings for this comparison
toward zero. With an infinitely large population
from which to select control group firms, one
would find for any acquiring firm a nonacquir
ing firm whose residuals correlate perfectly,
leaving nothing to be explained. A two-digit in
dustry is not an infinite population, but it is
large enough to introduce serious bias toward
zero. Nevertheless, the same preevent-positiveexcess-returns,
postevent-negative-excess-retums pattern appears even after netting out the
movements in the control group returns (see
Table 2, p. 377).
14. Since Langetieg (1978) adds a, back into
his estimate of abnormal returns, his is really an
estimate relative to both the market portfolio
and the two-digit SIC industry and should be in
cluded with this group.
15. Other studies reporting substantial posi
tive premerger returns for acquiring firms are
Lev and Mandelker (1972) and Cosh et al.
(1980).
16. Other studies reporting postmerger pe
riod declines include Hogarty (1970); Cosh et al.
(1980); Dodd (1980); Jenny and Weber (1980);
and Mueller (1980).
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